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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
Le Conte v. Irvin, 19 S. C. 554, in the same jurisdiction as the instant case goes
even further and holds that the attorney for the plaintiff had the right at the
foreclosure sale to purchase the property for himself, as he had no duty to per-
form that was inconsistent with the character of purchaser.
The court in the instant case, in ordering the bank to comply with its at-
torney's bid, said in part, "While not necessarily controlling, yet the custom of
business as to what by common practice usually is expected of an attorney in
the foreclosure of a mortgage of real estate, may not be wholly ignored. As a
general proposition, when an attorney is employed to foreclose a mortgage of
real estate, he is expected and it is the common practice at the bar of this state,
not only to represent his client to the point of obtaining a decree of foreclosure
and sale, but also to attend the sale, to see that his client's interest is not sacri-
ficed or defeated, to make settlement with the officer conducting the sale, and
to obtain a report and an order confirming the sale. If necessary to the pro-
tection of his client's interest, it is usual for the attorney to participate in the
sale; indeed he would be derelict in his duty should he permit property to be
bought for grossly inadequate amount which would result in his client's receiv-
ing nothing upon his demand." To sustain this contention the court cites Smith
v. Cunningham, 59 Kans. 552, 53 P. 760, and Cauthen v. Cauthen, 76 S. C. 226,
56 S. E. 978. In the last mentioned case the court says, "It is held that the client
is bound by the action of his attorney in relation to all matters within the scope
of the action."
It would seem to the writer, that although the case is not supported by au-
thorities, yet the principles upon which it is based are sound and meritorious.
The case marks a step forward in the liberal interpretation of the law in keep-
ing with the changing conditions of the times. W. J. P. '27.
AUTOMOBILES-MASTER AND SERVANT.-Defendant's minor son wrongfully
damaged plaintiff's automobile in collision while returning from deviating ten
miles from authorized trip, for own benefit, to resume father's business. Held,
father not liable for damages as authority of son ceased when he deviated from
route for his own benefit. Carder v. Martin, (Okla.,) 250 P. 906.
The universal test of the master's liability for acts of his servants is: Was
there authority, express or implied, for doing the act? That is, was it done in
the course of and within the scope of the servant's employment? If so, the
master will be liable for the act, whether negligent, fraudulent, deceitful or any
act of positive malfeasance. Tyler v. Stephans, Adm'x. 163 Ky. 770, 174 S. W.
790. "An owner of an automobile is not liable for injuries to a pedestrian mere-
ly because he owns the car, or because the chauffeur was not engaged in the de-
fendant's business." Freibaum v. Brady, 128 N. Y. S. 121, 142 App, Div. 220.
As the court said in Lotz v. Hanlon, 217 Pa. 339, 66 AtI. 525, 10 L. R. A. (N.
S.) 202, "But it comes to nothing that the driver was the defendant's servant,
if it appears that at the time the accident happened he was not on the master's
errand or business. If he were on an errand of his own, then so long as so
engaged he did not stand in the relation of servant." This rule is not modified
where the servant is the son of the master. Lenville v. Nissen, 162 N. C. 95, 77
S. E. 1096. Similarily, no liability on master if servant is at liberty from serv-
ice pursuing his own ends exclusively. Cincinnati, N. 0. & T. P. Ry. Co. v.
Rue, 142 Ky. 694, 134 S. W. 1144, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 200; Sullivan v. L. & N.
115 Ky. 450, 74 S. W. 171. In Coldwell v. Aetna Bottle Co. 33 R. I. 531, 82 Atl.
388 a chauffeur was directed to drive an automobile to a garage, but deviated to
take co-employe home. Court held master not liable for injury caused after
deviating. Like the holding in Steffen v. McNaughtn 142 Wis. 49, 124 N. W.
1016, 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 382. Distance of departure for personal errAnd held
determining factor in Fleischner v. Durgin, 207 Mass. 435, 95 N. E. 801 where
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master was not liable for servant who deviated several miles. Nor is employer
of driver operating car on week days liable for negligence of driver on Sunday
for own benefit. Tinker v. Herst 162 La.-, 110 S. 324. Courts have, however,
held employers liable for damage caused by servants during incidental de-
parture, the employe never having left the general penumbra of his duty.
Hayes v. Wilkins 194 Mass. 223, 80 N. E. 449, 92 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1033. Even
where driver deviated several blocks on his own mission, court held master
liable for damages caused by horses running away. Ritchie v. Waller 63 Conn.
155, 28 Atl 29, 27 L. R. A. 161. Same rule applied in Loomis v. Hollister, 75
Conn. 718, 55 Atl. 561. Mulvihill v. Bates, 31 Minn. 364, 17 N. W. 959. By the
weight of authority, however, a master is not liable unless the servant is act-
ing in scope of his authorized duty when accident occurs. Johnston v. Hare,
(Arizona) 246 P. 546. E. C. F. '27.
BIGAMY-MARRIAGE--AGE OF CoNsENT.-Defendant, who was married to a
woman previously married at the age of eleven to another from whom she had
never procured a decree of divorce, separated from her and contracted a second
marriage. He was convicted of bigamy, and appeals. Held, that first marriage
of first wife was voidable and not void, that marriage to defendant was a
nullity, that second marriage of defendant was valid, and that therefore he
must be discharged. State v. Sellers, (S. C. 1926) 134 S. E. 873.
The whole case turns on what constitutes an affirmance or avoidance of a
marriage contracted before the age of consent. The majority opinion holds
that in order for a conviction of bigamy to be sustained, the first contract must
be executed or solemnized in some manner. Even a voidable marriage may be
the basis for the crime of bigamy. State v. Smith, 101 S. C. 293, 85 S. E. 958;
3 R. C. L. 796; 71 C. J. 1159. The voidable marriage is not abrogated by mutual
agreement after attaining the age of consent. There must be a court decree.
This is held so because marriage is such an important institution and figures so
much in the lives of the people that women should be given the utmost pro-
tection to determine what their exact status is. It is for the good of society
that women and their children should not be in a position where their integrity
is doubted, State v. Sellers, supra.
In this case there is also a powerful dissent which deserves attention. This
opinion argues that the first marriage of the defendant's first wife was made a
nullity by the fact that the couple separated soon after the ceremony and never
reunited. It was insisted that the marriage might be disaffirmed at any time
during nonage. 38 C. J. 1283. But it goes much further in saying that even
if the parties did not avoid by their acts, still the first marriage of the wife was
a nullity, and the defendant should be convicted. The first marriage was not
voidable, but merely inchoate and imperfect, the minority says, which is as
much as to say that it was void. The marriage merely had the capacity of be-
ing validated. 38 C. J. 1283. See also Davis v. Whitlock, 90 S. C. 233, 23 S. E.
171. C. H. L. '28.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-ZONING ORDINANcE-Bill
for injunction to restrain enforcement of municipal ordinance dividing village
into zones or restrictive districts, in some of which buildings to be used for
any business purposes or for apartment houses were excluded. ,Objection was
to ordinance as entirety, on ground it decreased value of complainant's property
by restricting its use. Held, ordinance was not unconstitutional as depriving
complainant of liberty or property without due process of law, as it could be
justified under police power. In considering what is reasonable exercise of
police power circumstances of time and locality must be considered, and the
right thing in the wrong place may be a nuisance. Exclusion of business and
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